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Abstract
Learning a classifier from private data collected
by multiple parties is an important problem that
has many potential applications. How can we
build an accurate and differentially private global
classifier by combining locally-trained classifiers
from different parties, without access to any
party’s private data? We propose to transfer the
‘knowledge’ of the local classifier ensemble by
first creating labeled data from auxiliary unla-
beled data, and then train a global -differentially
private classifier. We show that majority voting
is too sensitive and therefore propose a new risk
weighted by class probabilities estimated from
the ensemble. Relative to a non-private solution,
our private solution has a generalization error
bounded by O(−2M−2) where M is the num-
ber of parties. This allows strong privacy with-
out performance loss whenM is large, such as in
crowdsensing applications. We demonstrate the
performance of our method with realistic tasks of
activity recognition, network intrusion detection,
and malicious URL detection.
1. Introduction
Consider the problem of performing machine learning with
data collected by multiple parties. In many settings, the
parties may not wish to disclose the private information.
For example, the parties can be medical institutions who
aim to perform collaborative research using sensitive pa-
tient information they hold. For another example, the par-
ties can be computer users who aim to collectively build
a malware detector without sharing their usage data. A
conventional approach to learning from multiparty data is
to first collect data from all parties and then process them
centrally. When privacy is a major concern, this approach
is not always an appropriate solution since it is vulnera-
ble to attacks during transmission, storage, and processing
of data. Instead, we will consider a setting in which each
party trains a local classifier from its private data without
sending the data. The goal is to build a global classifier
by combining local classifiers efficiently and privately. We
expect the global classifier to be more accurate than indi-
vidual local classifiers, as it has access to more information
than individual classifiers.
This problem of aggregating classifiers was considered in
(Pathak et al., 2010), where the authors proposed averaging
of the parameters of local classifiers to get a global classi-
fier. To prevent the leak of private information from the av-
eraged parameters, the authors used a differentially private
mechanism. Differential privacy measures maximal change
in the probability of any outcome of a procedure when any
item is added to or removed from a database. It provides
a strict upper bound on the privacy loss against any adver-
sary (Dwork & Nissim, 2004; Dwork et al., 2006; Dwork,
2006). Parameter averaging is a simple and practical proce-
dure that can be implemented by Secure Multiparty Com-
putation (Yao, 1982). However, averaging is not applicable
to classifiers with non-numerical parameters such as deci-
sion trees, nor to a collection of different classifier types.
This raises the question if there are more flexible and per-
haps better ways of aggregating local classifiers privately.
In this paper, we propose a method of building a global
differentially private classifier from an ensemble of lo-
cal classifier in two steps (see Fig. 1.) In the first step,
locally-trained classifiers are collected by a trusted entity.
A naive approach to use the collected classifiers is to re-
lease (the parameters of) the classifiers after sanitization
by differentially private mechanisms, which is impractical
(Sec. 3.2.) Instead, we use the classifier ensemble to gener-
ates (pseudo)labels for auxiliary unlabeled data, thus trans-
ferring the knowledge of the ensemble to the auxiliary data.
In the second step, we use the labeled auxiliary data to find
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Figure 1. Workflow of the proposed algorithm. Assume that the parties are smart devices. Each party holds a small amount of private
data and uses the data to train a local classifier. The ensemble of local classifiers collected then generates labels for auxiliary data, which
in turn are used for training a global classifier. The final classifier is released after sanitization for privacy.
an empirical risk minimizer, and release a differentially pri-
vate classifier using output perturbation (Chaudhuri et al.,
2011).
When generating labels for auxiliary data using an ensem-
ble of classifiers, majority voting is the simplest choice.
However, we show quantitatively that a global classifier
trained from majority-voted labels is highly sensitive to
individual votes of local classifiers. Consequently, the fi-
nal classifier after differentially-private sanitization suffer
a heavy loss in its performance. To address this, we pro-
pose a new risk insensitive to individual votes, where each
sample is weighted by the confidence of the ensemble.
We provide an interpretation of the weighted risk in terms
of random hypothesis of an ensemble (Breiman, 1996a)
in contrast to deterministic labeling rule of majority vot-
ing. One of our main results is in Theorem 4: we can
achieve -differential privacy with a generalization error of
O(−2M−2) and O(N−1) terms, relative to the expected
risk of a non-private solution, where M is the number of
parties and N is the number of samples in auxiliary data.
This result is especially useful in a scenario where there are
a large number of parties with weak local classifiers such
as a group of connected smart devices with limited com-
puting capability. We demonstrate the performance of our
approach with several realistic tasks: activity recognition,
network intrusion detection, and malicious URL detection.
The results show that it is feasible to achieve both accuracy
and privacy with a large number of parties.
To summarize, we propose a method of building a global
differentially private classifier from locally-trained classi-
fiers of multiple parties without access to their private data.
The proposed method has the following advantages: 1) it
can use local classifiers of any (mixed) types and there-
fore is flexible; 2) its generalization error converges to that
of a non-private solution with a fast rate of O(−2M−2)
and O(N−1); 3) it also provides -differential privacy to
all samples of a party and not just a single sample.
In Sec. 2, we formally describe privacy definitions. In
Sec. 3, we discuss the first step of leveraging unlabeled
data, and in Sec. 4, we present the second step of find-
ing a global private classifier via empirical risk minimiza-
tion in two different forms. In Sec. 5, we discuss related
works. We evaluate the methods with real tasks in Sec. 6
and conclude the paper in Sec. 7. Appendix contains omit-
ted proofs and several extensions of the algorithms.
2. Preliminary
2.1. Differential privacy
A randomized algorithm that takes dataD as input and out-
puts a function f is called -differentially private if
P (f(D) ∈ S)
P (f(D′) ∈ S) ≤ e
 (1)
for all measurable S ⊂ T of the output range and for all
datasets D and D′ differing in a single item, denoted by
D ∼ D′. That is, even if an adversary knows the whole
dataset D except for a single item, she cannot infer much
about the unknown item from the output f of the algorithm.
When an algorithm outputs a real-valued vector f ∈ RD,
its global L2 sensitivity (Dwork et al., 2006) can be defined
as
S(f) = max
D∼D′
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖ (2)
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where ‖·‖ is theL2 norm. An important result from (Dwork
et al., 2006) is that a vector-valued output f with sensitivity
S(f) can be made -differentially private by perturbing f
with an additive noise vector η whose density is
P (η) ∝ e− S(f)‖η‖. (3)
2.2. Output perturbation
When a classifier which minimizes empirical risk is re-
leased in public, it leaks information about the training
data. Such a classifier can be sanitized by perturbation with
additive noise calibrated to the sensitivity of the classifier,
known as output perturbation method (Chaudhuri et al.,
2011). Specifically, the authors show the following. If ws
is the minimizer of the regularized empirical risk
RλS(w) =
1
N
∑
(x,y)∈S
l(h(x;w), y) +
λ
2
‖w‖2, (4)
Then the perturbed outputwp = ws+η, p(η) ∝ e−Nλ2 ‖η‖
is -differentially private for a single sample. Output per-
turbation was used to sanitize the averaged parameters in
(Pathak et al., 2010). We also use output perturbation to
sanitize global classifiers. One important difference of our
setting to previous work is that we consider -differential
privacy of all samples of a party, which is much stronger
than -differential privacy of a single sample.
There are conditions on the loss function for this guarantee
to hold. We will assume the following conditions for our
global classifier1 similar to (Chaudhuri et al., 2011).
• The loss-hypothesis has a form l(h(x;w), v)) =
l(vwTφ(x)), where φ : X → Rd is a fixed map.
We will consider only linear classifiers l(vwTx),
where any nonlinear map φ is absorbed into the d-
dimensional features.
• The surrogate loss l(·) is convex and continuously dif-
ferentiable.
• The derivative l′(·) is bounded: |l′(t)| ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ R,
and c-Lipschitz: |l′(s)− l′(t)| ≤ c|s− t|, ∀s, t ∈ R.
• The features are bounded: supx∈X ‖x‖ ≤ 1.
These conditions are satisfied by, e.g., logistic regression
loss (c = 1/4) and approximate hinge loss.
3. Transferring knowledge of ensemble
3.1. Local classifiers
In this paper, we treat local classifiers as M black boxes
h1(x), ..., hM (x). We assume that a local classifier hi(x)
1Local classifiers are allowed to be of any type.
is trained using its private i.i.d. training set S(i)
S(i) = {(x(i)1 , y(i)1 ), ... , (x(i)Ni , y
(i)
Ni
)}, (5)
where (x(i)j , y
(i)
j ) ∈ X ×{−1, 1} is a sample from a distri-
bution P (x, y) common to all parties. We consider binary
labels y ∈ {−1, 1} in the main paper, and present a multi-
class extension in Appendix B.
This splitting of training data across parties is similar to
the Bagging procedure (Breiman, 1996a) with some differ-
ences. In Bagging, the training set S(i) for party i is sam-
pled with replacement from the whole dataset D, whereas
in our setting, the training set is sampled without replace-
ment from D, more similar to the Subagging (Politis et al.,
1999) procedure.
3.2. Privacy issues of direct release
In the first step of our method, local classifiers from mul-
tiple parties are first collected by a trusted entity. A naive
approach to use the ensemble is to directly release the local
classifier parameters to the parties after appropriate sani-
tization. However, this is problematic in efficiency and
privacy. Releasing all M classifier parameters is an op-
eration with a constant sensitivity, as opposed to releasing
insensitive statistics such as an average whose sensitivity is
O(M−1). Releasing the classifiers requires much stronger
perturbation than necessary, incurring steep loss of perfor-
mance of sanitized classifiers. Besides, efficient differen-
tially private mechanisms are known only for certain types
of classifiers so far (see (Ji et al., 2014) for a review.) An-
other approach is to use the ensemble as a service to make
predictions for test data followed by appropriate sanitiza-
tion. Suppose we use majority voting to provide a pre-
diction for a test sample. A differentially private mecha-
nism such as Report Noisy Max (Dwork & Roth, 2013) can
be used to sanitize the votes for a single query. However,
answering several queries requires perturbing all answers
with noise linearly proportional to the number of queries,
which is impractical in most realistic settings.
3.3. Leveraging auxiliary data
To address the problems above, we propose to transfer the
knowledge of the ensemble to a global classifier using aux-
iliary unlabeled data. More precisely, we use the ensemble
to generate (pseudo)labels for the auxiliary data, which in
turn are used to train a global classifier. Compared to di-
rectly releasing local classifiers, releasing a global classifier
trained on auxiliary data is a much less sensitive operation
with O(M−1) (Sec. 4.4) analogous to releasing an average
statistic. The number of auxiliary samples does not affect
privacy, and in fact the larger the data the closer the global
classifier is to the original ensemble with O(N−1) bound
(Sec. 4.4). Also, compared to using the ensemble to an-
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swer prediction queries, the sanitized global classifier can
be used as many times as needed without its privacy being
affected.
We argue that the availability of auxiliary unlabeled data
is not an issue, since in many settings they are practically
much easier to collect than labeled data. Furthermore, if
the auxiliary data are obtained from public repositories, pri-
vacy of such data is not an immediate concern. We mainly
focus on the privacy of local data, and discuss extensions
for preserving the privacy of auxiliary data in Sec. 4.5.
4. Finding a global private classifier
We present details of training a global private classifier. As
the first attempt, we use majority voting of an ensemble to
assign labels to auxiliary data, and find a global classifier
from the usual ERM procedure. In the second attempt, we
present a better approach where we use the ensemble to
estimate the posterior P (y|x) of the auxiliary samples and
solve a ‘soft-labeled’ weighted empirical minimization.
4.1. First attempt: ERM with majority voting
As the first attempt, we use majority voting ofM local clas-
sifiers to generate labels of auxiliary data, and analyze its
implications. Majority voting for binary classification is
the following rule
v(x) =
{
1, if
∑M
i=1 I[hi(x) = 1] ≥ M2−1, otherwise . (6)
Ties can be ignored by assuming an odd number M of par-
ties. Regardless of local classifier types or how they are
trained, we can consider the majority vote of the ensem-
ble {h1, ..., hM} as a deterministic target concept to train a
global classifier.
The majority-voted auxiliary data are
S = {(x1, v(x1)), ..., (xN , v(xN ))}, (7)
where xi ∈ X is an i.i.d. sample from the same distribution
P (x) as the private data. We train a global classifier by
minimizing the (regularized) empirical risk associated with
a loss and a hypothesis class:
RλS(w) =
1
N
∑
(x,v)∈S
l(h(x;w), v) +
λ
2
‖w‖2. (8)
The corresponding expected risks with and without regu-
larization are
Rλ(w) = Ex[l(h(x;w), v(x))] +
λ
2
‖w‖2, (9)
and
R(w) = Ex[l(h(x;w), v(x))]. (10)
Algorithm 1 DP Ensemble by Majority-voted ERM
Input: h1, ..., hM (local classifiers), X (auxiliary unlabeled
samples), , λ
Output: wp
Begin
for i = 1, ... , N do
Generate majority voted labels v(xi) by (6)
end for
Find the minimizer ws of (8) with S = {(xi, v(xi))}
Sample a random vector η from p(η) ∝ e−0.5λ‖η‖
Output wp = ws + η
Algorithm 1 summarizes the procedure.
Applying output perturbation to our multiparty setting
gives us the following result.
Theorem 1. The perturbed output wp = ws + η from Al-
gorithm 1 with p(η) ∝ e−λ2 ‖η‖ is -differentially private.
The proof of the theorem and others are in the Appendix A.
4.2. Performance issues of majority voting
We briefly discuss the generalization error of majority-
voted ERM. In (Chaudhuri et al., 2011), it is shown that
the expected risk of an output-perturbed ERM solution wp
with respect to the risk of any reference hypothesis w0 is
bounded by two terms – one due to noise and another due to
the gap between expected and empirical regularized risks.
This result is applicable to the majority-voted ERM with
minor modifications. The sensitivity of majority-voted
ERM from Theorem 1 is 2λ compared to
2
Nλ of a standard
ERM, and corresponding the error bound is
R(wp) ≤ R(w0) +O(−2) +O(N−1), (11)
with high probability, ignoring other variables. Unfortu-
nately, the bound does not guarantee a successful learning
due to the constant gap O(−2), which can be large for a
small .
What causes this is the worst-case scenario of multiparty
voting. Suppose the votes of M − 1 local classifiers are
exactly ties for all auxiliary samples {x1, ..., xN}. If we
replace a local classifier hi(x) with the ‘opposite’ clas-
sifier h′i(x) = −hi(x), then the majority-voted labels
{v1, ..., vN} become {−v1, ...,−vN}, and the resultant
global classifier is entirely different. However unlikely this
scenario may be in reality, differential privacy requires that
we calibrate our noise to the worst case sensitivity.
4.3. Better yet: weighted ERM with soft labels
The main problem with majority voting was its sensitivity
to the decision of a single party. Let α(x) be the fraction of
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positive votes from M classifiers given a sample x:
α(x) =
1
M
M∑
j=1
I[hj(x) = 1]. (12)
In terms of α, the original loss l(wTxv(x)) for majority
voting can be written as
l(ywTx) = I[α(x) ≥ 0.5] l(wTx)
+ I[α(x) < 0.5] l(−wTx), (13)
which changes abruptly when the fraction α(x) crosses the
boundary α = 0.5. We remedy the situation by introducing
the new weighted loss:
lα(·) = α(x)l(wTx) + (1− α(x))l(−wTx). (14)
The new loss has the following properties. When the
M votes given a sample x are unanimously positive (or
negative), then the weighted loss is lα(·) = l(wTx) (or
l(−wTx)), same as the original loss. If the votes are al-
most evenly split between positive and negative, then the
weighted loss is lα(·) ' 0.5 l(wTx)+0.5 l(−wTx) which
is insensitive to the change of label by a single vote, un-
like the original loss. Specifically, a single vote can change
lα(·) only by a factor of 1/M (see Proof of Theorem 3.)
We provide a natural interpretation of α(x) and the
weighted loss in the following. For the purpose of anal-
ysis, assume that the local classifiers h1(x), ..., hM (x) are
from the same hypothesis class.2 Since the local training
data are i.i.d. samples from P (x, y), the local classifiers
{h1(x), ..., hM (x)} can be considered random hypotheses,
as in (Breiman, 1996a). Let Q(j|x) be the probability of
such a random hypothesis h(x) predicting label j given x:
Q(j|x) = P (h(x) = j|x), (15)
Then the fraction α(x) = 1M
∑M
j=1 I[hj(x) = 1] is an
unbiased estimate of Q(1|x). Furthermore, the weighted
loss is directly related to the unweighted loss:
Lemma 2. For any w, the expectation of the weighted loss
(14) is asymptotically the expectation of the unweighted
loss:
lim
M→∞
Ex[l
α(w)] = Ex,v[l(w
Txv)]. (16)
Proof. The expected risk Ex,v[l(vwTx)] is
= ExEv|x[l(vwTx)]
= Ex[Q(1|x)l(wTx) +Q(−1|x)l(−wTx)]
= Ex[ lim
M→∞
α(x)l(wTx) + (1− lim
M→∞
α(x))l(−wTx)]
2Our differential privacy guarantee holds whether they are
from the same hypothesis class or not.
Algorithm 2 DP Ensemble by Weighted ERM
Input: h1, ..., hM (local classifiers), X (auxiliary unlabeled
samples), , λ
Output: wp
Begin
for i = 1, ... , N do
Compute α(xi) by (12)
end for
Find the minimizer of ws of (19) with {(xi, α(xi))}
Sample a random vector η from p(η) ∝ e−0.5Mλ‖η‖
Output wp = ws + η
(the law of large numbers)
= lim
M→∞
Ex[α(x)l(w
Tx) + (1− α(x))l(−wTx)]
(bounded α and l for ∀x ∈ X )
= lim
M→∞
Ex[l
α(w)]. (17)
This shows that minimizing the expected weighted loss is
asymptotically the same as minimizing the standard ex-
pected loss, when the target v is a probabilistic concept
from P (h(x) = v) of the random hypothesis, as opposed
to a deterministic concept v(x) from majority voting.
The auxiliary dataset with ‘soft’ labels is now
S = {(x1, α(x1)), ... , (xN , α(xN ))}. (18)
where xi ∈ X is an i.i.d. sample from the same distribution
P (x) as the private data, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Note that we are
not trying to learn a regression function X → [0, 1] but to
learn a classifier X → {−1, 1} using α as a real-valued
oracle on P (y = 1|x). Consequently, we find a global
classifier by minimizing the regularized weighted empirical
risk
RλS(w) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
lα(h(xi;w), αi) +
λ
2
‖w‖2, (19)
where αi = α(xi). The corresponding expected risks with
and without regularization are
Rλ(w) = Ex[l
α(h(x;w), α(x))] +
λ
2
‖w‖2, (20)
and
R(w) = Ex[l
α(h(x;w), α(x))]. (21)
We again use output perturbation to make the classifier dif-
ferentially private as summarized in Algorithm 2.
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4.4. Privacy and performance
Compared to Theorem 1 for majority-voted ERM with a
noise of P (η) ∝ e−λ2 ‖η‖, we have the following result:
Theorem 3. The perturbed output wp = ws + η from Al-
gorithm 2 with p(η) ∝ e−Mλ2 ‖η‖ is -differentially private.
That is, we now require 1/M times smaller noise to achieve
the same -differential privacy. This directly impacts the
performance of the corresponding global classifier as fol-
lows.
Theorem 4. Letw0 be any reference hypothesis. Then with
probability of at least 1− δp − δs over the privacy mecha-
nism (δp) and over the choice of samples (δs),
R(wp) ≤ R(w0) + 4d
2(c+ λ) log2(d/δp)
λ2M22
+
16(32 + log(1/δs))
λN
+
λ
2
‖w0‖2. (22)
The generalization error bound above has the O(M−2−2)
term compared to theO(−2) term for majority-voted ERM
(11). This implies that by choosing a largeM , Algorithm 2
can find a solution whose expected risk is close to the min-
imum of a non-private solution for any fixed privacy level
 > 0.
We remind the user that the results should be interpreted
with a caution. The bounds in (11) and (22) indicate the
goodness of private ERM solutions relative to the best non-
private solutions with deterministic and probability con-
cepts which are not the same task. Also, they do not in-
dicate the goodness of the ensemble approach itself rela-
tive to a centrally-trained classifier using all private data
without privacy consideration. We leave this comparison
to empirical evaluation in the experiment section.
4.5. Extensions
We discuss extensions of Algorithms 1 and 2 to provide ad-
ditional privacy for auxiliary data. More precisely, those al-
gorithms can be made -differentially private for all private
data of a single party and a single sample in the auxiliary
data, by increasing the amount of perturbation as necessary.
We outline the proof as follows. In the previous sections, a
global classifier was trained on auxiliary data whose labels
were generated either by majority voting or soft labeling. A
change in the local classifier affects only the labels {vi} of
the auxiliary data but not the features {xi}. Now assume in
addition that the feature of one sample from the auxiliary
data can also change arbitrarily, i.e., xj 6= x′j for some j
and xi = x′i for all i ∈ {1, ..., N} \ {j}. The sensitivity
of the resultant risk minimizer can be computed similarly
to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 3 in Appendix A. Briefly,
the sensitivity is upper-bounded by the absolute sum of the
difference of gradients
‖∇g(w)‖ ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
‖∇l(yiwTxi)−∇l(y′iwTx′i)‖. (23)
For majority voting, one term in the sum (23) is
‖v(xj)xj l′(v(xj)wTxj)− v′(x′j)x′j l′(v′(x′j)wTx′j)‖
(24)
which is at most 2 for any xj , x′j ∈ X , and therefore the
sensitivity is the same whether xj = x′j or not. As a re-
sult, Algorithm 1 is already -differentially private for both
labeled and auxiliary data without modification. Further-
more, the privacy guarantee remains the same if we allow
xj 6= x′j for any number of samples. For soft labeling, one
term in the sum (23) is
‖αjxj l′(wTxj)− (1− αj)xj l′(−wTxj)
−α′jx′j l′(wTx′j) + (1− α′j)x′j l′(−wTx′j)‖ (25)
which is also at most 2 for any xj , x′j ∈ X and 2M when
xj = x
′
j . When only a single auxiliary sample changes,
i.e., xj 6= x′j for one j, the overall sensitivity increases by
a factor of N+M−1N . By increasing the noise by this fac-
tor, Algorithm 2 is -differentially private for both labeled
and auxiliary data. Note that this factor N+M−1N can be
bounded close to 1 if we increase the number of auxiliary
samples N relative to the number of parties M .
5. Related work
To preserve privacy in data publishing, several approaches
such as k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002) and secure multi-
party computation (Yao, 1982) have been proposed (see
(Fung et al., 2010) for a review.) Recently, differential pri-
vacy (Dwork & Nissim, 2004; Dwork et al., 2006; Dwork,
2006) has addressed several weaknesses of k-anonymity
(Ganta et al., 2008), and gained popularity as a quantifiable
measure of privacy risk. The measure provides a bound
on the privacy loss regardless of any additional informa-
tion an adversary might have. Differential privacy has been
used for a privacy-preserving data analysis platform (Mc-
Sherry, 2009), and for sanitization of learned model param-
eters from a standard ERM (Chaudhuri et al., 2011). This
paper adopts output perturbation techniques from the lat-
ter to sanitize non-standard ERM solutions from multiparty
settings.
Private learning from multiparty data has been studied
previously. In particular, several differentially-private
algorithms were proposed, including parameter averag-
ing through secure multiparty computation (Pathak et al.,
2010), and private exchange of gradient information to
minimize empirical risks incrementally (Rajkumar & Agar-
wal, 2012; Hamm et al., 2015). Our paper is motivated by
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(Pathak et al., 2010) but uses a very different approach to
aggregate local classifiers. In particular, we use an ensem-
ble approach and average the classifier decisions (Breiman,
1996a) instead of parameters, which makes our approach
applicable to arbitrary and mixed classifier types. Advan-
tages of ensemble approaches in general have been ana-
lyzed previously, in terms of bias-variance decomposition
(Breiman, 1996b), and in terms of the margin of training
samples (Schapire et al., 1998).
Furthermore, we are using unlabeled data to augment la-
beled data during training, which can be considered a semi-
supervised learning method (Chapelle et al., 2006). There
are several related papers in this direction. Augmenting
private data with non-private labeled data to lower the sen-
sitivity of the output is straightforward, and was demon-
strated in medical applications (Ji et al., 2014). Using non-
private unlabeled data, which is more general than using
labeled data, was demonstrated specifically to assist learn-
ing of random forests (Jagannathan et al., 2013). Our use
of auxiliary data is not specific to classifier types. Further-
more, we present an extension to preserve the privacy of
auxiliary data as well.
6. Experiments
We use three real-world datasets to compare the perfor-
mance of the following algorithms:
• batch: classifier trained using all data ignoring privacy
• soft: private ensemble using soft-labels (Algorithm 2)
• avg: parameter averaging (Pathak et al., 2010)
• vote: private ensemble using majority voting (Algo-
rithm 1)
• indiv: individually trained classifier using local data
We can expect batch to perform better than any private al-
gorithm since it uses all private data for training ignoring
privacy. In contrast, indiv uses only the local data for train-
ing and will perform significantly worse than batch, but it
achieves a perfect privacy as long as the trained classifiers
are kept local to the parties. We are interested in the range
of  where private algorithms (soft, avg, and vote) perform
better than the baseline indiv.
To compare all algorithms fairly, we use only a single type
of classier – binary or multiclass logistic regression. For
Algorithms 1 and 2, both local and global classifiers are of
this type as well. The only hyperparameter of the model is
the regularization coefficient λ which we fixed to 10−4 af-
ter performing some preliminary experiments.About 10%
of the original training data are used as auxiliary unlabeled
data, and the rest 90% are randomly distributed to M par-
ties as private data. We report the mean and s.d. over 10
trials for non-private algorithms and 100-trials for private
algorithms.
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Figure 2. Test accuracy of private and non-private algorithms for
activity recognition withK = 6 activity types.
6.1. Activity recognition using accelerometer
Consider a scenario where wearable device users want to
train a motion-based activity classifier without revealing
her data to others. To test the algorithms, we use the
UCI Human Activity Recognition Dataset (Anguita et al.,
2012), which is a collection of motion sensor data on a
smart device by multiple subjects performing 6 activities
(walking, walking upstairs, walking downstairs, sitting,
standing, laying). Various time and frequency domain vari-
ables are extracted from the signal, and we apply PCA to
get d = 50 dimensional features. The training and testing
samples are 7K and 3K, respectively.
We simulate a case with M = 1K users (i.e., parties).
Each user can use only 6 samples to train a local classi-
fier. The remaining 1K samples are used as auxiliary un-
labeled data. Figure 2 shows the test accuracy of using
different algorithms with varying privacy levels. For non-
private algorithms, the top solid line (batch) shows the ac-
curacy of a batch-trained classifier at around 0.90, and the
bottom dashed line (indiv) shows the averaged accuracy of
local classifiers at around 0.47. At 1/ = 0, the private
algorithms achieve test accuracy of 0.79 (vote), 0.76 (soft)
and 0.67 (avg), and as the the privacy level 1/ increases,
the performance drops for all private algorithms. As ex-
pected from the bound (11), vote becomes useless even at
1/ = 0.1, while soft and avg are better than indiv until
1/ = 1. We fixed M to 1000 in this experiment due to
the limited number of samples, the tendency in the graph is
similar to other experiments with larger M ’s.
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Figure 3. Test accuracy of private and non-private algorithms for network intrusion detection.
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Figure 4. Test accuracy of private and non-private algorithms for malicious URL detection.
6.2. Network intrusion detection
Consider a scenario where multiple gateways or routers
collect suspicious network activities independently, and
aim to collaboratively build an accurate network intrusion
detector without revealing local traffic data. For this task
we use the KDD-99 dataset, which consists of examples of
‘bad’ connections, called intrusions or attacks, and ‘good’
normal connections. Features of this dataset consists of
continuous values and categorical attributes. To apply lo-
gistic regression, we change categorical attributes to one-
hot vectors to get d = 123 dimensional features. The train-
ing and testing samples are 493K and 311K, respectively.
We simulate cases withM = 5K/10K/20K parties. Each
party can only use 22 samples to train a local classifier.
The remaining 43K samples are used as auxiliary unla-
beled data. Figure 3 shows the test accuracy of using dif-
ferent algorithms with varying privacy levels. For each of
M = 5K/10K/20K the tendency of algorithms is similar
to Figure 2 – for a small 1/, private algorithms perform
roughly in between batch and indiv, and as 1/ increases
private algorithms start to perform worse than indiv. When
M is large (e.g., M = 20K), private algorithms soft and
avg hold their accuracy better than when M is small (e.g.,
M = 5K.) In particular, soft performs nearly as well as the
non-private batch until around 1/ = 10 compared to avg .
6.3. Malicious URL prediction
In addition to network intrusion detection, multiple parties
such as computer users can collaborate on detecting mali-
cious URLs without revealing the visited URLs. The Ma-
licious URL Dataset (Ma et al., 2009) is a collection of ex-
amples of malicious URLs from a large Web mail provider.
The task is to predict whether a URL is malicious or not
by various lexical and host-based features of the URL. We
apply PCA to get d = 50 dimensional feature vectors. We
choose days 0 to 9 for training, and days 10 to 19 for test-
ing, which amount to 200K samples for training and 200K
samples for testing.
We simulate cases withM = 5K/10K/20K parties. Each
party can use only 9 samples to train a local classifier. The
remaining 16K samples are used as auxiliary unlabeled
data. Figure 4 shows the test accuracy of using different
algorithms with varying privacy levels. The gap between
batch and other algorithms is larger compared to the pre-
vious experiment (Figure 3), most likely due to the smaller
number (=9) of samples per party. However, the overall
tendency is very similar to previous experiments.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a method of building global dif-
ferentially private classifiers from local classifiers using
two new ideas: 1) leveraging unlabeled auxiliary data to
transfer the knowledge of the ensemble, and 2) solving a
weighted ERM using class probability estimates from the
ensemble. In general, privacy comes with a loss of classifi-
cation performance. We present a solution to minimize the
performance gap between private and non-private ensem-
bles demonstrated with real world tasks.
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A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1: The perturbed output wp = ws + η from Algo-
rithm 1 with p(η) ∝ e−λ2 ‖η‖ is -differentially private.
Proof. We will compute the sensitivity of the minimizer
ws of the regularized empirical risk with majority-voted
labels (8). Suppose D = (S(1), ..., S(M)) is the or-
dered set of private training data (5) for M parties, and
D′ = ((S′)(1), ..., S(M)) is a neighboring set which dif-
fers from D only at party 1’s data, without loss of gener-
ality. The local classifiers after training with D and D′ are
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H = (h1, ..., hM ) and H ′ = (h′1, ..., hM ), respectively,
which are again different only for classifier 1. The majority
votes v(x) and v′(x) from D and D′ generates two auxil-
iary training sets S = {(xi, v(xi))} and S′ = {(xi, v′(xi)}
which have the same features but possibly different labels.
Let RλS(w) and R
λ
S′(w) be the regularized empirical risks
for training sets S and S′, and let ws and ws′ be the min-
imizers of the respective risks. From Corollaries 7 and 8
(Chaudhuri et al., 2011), the L2 difference of ws and ws′ is
bounded by
‖ws − ws′‖ ≤ 1
λ
max
w
‖∇g(w)‖, (26)
where g(w) is the risk difference RλS(w)−RλS′(w), which,
in our case, satisfies
‖∇g(w)‖ ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
‖v(xi)xil′(v(xi)wTxi)
−v′(xi)xil′(v′(xi)wTxi)‖.
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
‖xi‖ ×
|l′(wTxi) + l′(−wTxi)|. (27)
Recall that ‖x‖ ≤ 1 and |l′(·)| ≤ 1 by assumption. In
the worst case, v(xi) 6= v′(xi) for all i = 1, ..., N , and
therefore the RHS of (27) is bounded by 2. Consequently,
the L2 sensitivity of the minimizer ws is
max
S,S′
‖ws − ws′‖ ≤ 2
λ
. (28)
-differential privacy follows from the sensitivity result (3).
A.2. Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3: The perturbed output wp = ws + η from Algo-
rithm 2 with p(η) ∝ e−Mλ2 ‖η‖ is -differentially private.
Proof. The proof parallels the proof of Theorem 1. We
again assume D = (S(1), ..., S(M)) is the ordered set
of private training data (5) for M parties, and D′ =
((S′)(1), ..., S(M)) is a neighboring set which differs from
D only at party 1’s data, without loss of generality. Let
S = {(xi, αi)} and S′ = {(xi, α′i)} be the two result-
ing datasets which have the same the features but possibly
different α’s. We first compute the sensitivity of the mini-
mizer of the weighted regularized empirical risk (19). Let
RλS(w) and R
λ
S′(w) be the regularized empirical risks for
training sets S and S′, and let ws and ws′ be the minimiz-
ers of the respective risks. Also let g(w) be the difference
RλS(w)−RλS′(w) of two risks
g(w) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[αil(w
Txi) + (1− αi)l(−wTxi)
−α′il(wTxi)− (1− α′i)l(−wTxi)]. (29)
The gradient of g(w) is bounded by
‖∇g(w)‖ ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
[|αi − α′i|‖xi‖|l′(wTxi)|
+|αi − α′i|‖xi‖|l′(−wTxi)|] (30)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
2|αi − α′i|. (31)
In the worst case, αi 6= α′i for all i = 1, ..., N . Since αi
is the fraction of positive votes, |αi − α′i| ≤ 1/M holds
for all i = 1, ..., N . Therefore the L2 sensitivity of the
minimizer ws is at most 2λM and the -differential privacy
follows.
A.3. Lemma 5
We use the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Lemma 17 of (Chaudhuri et al., 2011)). If X ∼
Γ(k, θ), where k is an integer, then with probability of at
least 1− δ,
X ≤ kθ log(k/δ).
A.4. Lemma 6
Lemma 6. If ws is the minimizer of (19) and wp is the -
differentially private version from Algorithm 2, then with
probability of at least 1− δp over the privacy mechanism,
RλS(wp) ≤ RλS(ws) +
2d2(c+ λ) log2(d/δ)
λ2M22
(32)
Proof. A differentiable function f : Rd → R is called β-
smooth, if ∃β > 0 such that ‖∇f(v)−∇f(u)‖ ≤ β‖v−u‖
for all u, v. From the Mean Value Theorem, such a function
satisfies
f(v) ≤ f(u) +∇T f(u)(v − u) + β
2
‖v − u‖2, ∀u, v.
Since |l′(·)| is c-Lipschitz, RλS(w) is (c+ λ)-smooth:
‖∇RλS(v)−∇RλS(u)‖
≤ 1
N
∑
i
∥∥αixil′(vTxi)− (1− αi)xil′(−vTxi)
−αixil′(uTxi) + (1− αi)xil′(−uTxi)
∥∥
+λ‖v − u‖
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≤ 1
N
∑
i
[
αic‖(v − u)Txi‖+
(1− αi)c‖(u− v)Txi‖
]
+ λ‖v − u‖
≤ (c+ λ)‖u− v‖. (33)
By setting v = wp and u = ws and using the (c + λ)-
smoothness of RλS(w), we have
RλS(wp) ≤ RλS(ws) +∇TRλS(ws)(wp − ws)
+
(c+ λ)
2
‖wp − w∗s‖2
= RλS(ws) +
(c+ λ)
2
‖wp − ws‖2. (34)
Since
P
(
‖wp − w∗s‖ ≤
2d log(d/δ)
λM
)
≥ 1− δp (35)
from Lemma 5 with k = d and θ = 2λM , we have the
desired result.
A.5. Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4: Let w0 be any reference hypothesis. Then with
probability of at least 1− δp − δs over the privacy mecha-
nism (δp) and over the choice of samples (δs),
R(wp) ≤ R(w0) + 4d
2(c+ λ) log2(d/δp)
λ2M22
+
16(32 + log(1/δs))
λN
+
λ
2
‖w0‖2. (36)
Proof. Let ws and w∗ be the minimizers of the regularized
empirical risk (19) and the regularized expected risk (20),
respectively. The risk at wp relative to a reference classifier
w0 can be written as
R(wp)−R(w0) = Rλ(wp)−Rλ(w∗)
+Rλ(w∗)−Rλ(w0)
+
λ
2
‖w0‖2 − λ
2
‖wp‖2
≤ Rλ(wp)−Rλ(w∗) + λ
2
‖w0‖2.
(37)
The inequality above follows from Rλ(w∗) ≤ Rλ(w0) by
definition. Note that since ‖x‖ ≤ 1 and |l′| ≤ 1 by assump-
tion, the weighted loss α(x)l(wTx) + (1 − α(x))l(wTx)
is 1-Lipschitz in w. From Theorem 1 of (Sridharan et al.,
2009) with a = 1, we can also bound Rλ(wp) − Rλ(w∗)
as
Rλ(wp)−Rλ(w∗) ≤ 2(RλS(wp)−RλS(w∗s))
+
16(32 + log(1/δs))
λN
(38)
with probability of 1 − δs over the choice of samples. By
combining this inequality with Lemma 6 using the union
bound, we have
Rλ(wp)−Rλ(w∗) ≤ 4d
2(c+ λ) log2(d/δp)
λ2M22
+
16(32 + log(1/δs))
λN
. (39)
The theorem follows from (37).
B. Differentially private multiclass logistic
regression
We extend our methods to multiclass classification prob-
lems and provide a sketch of -differential privacy proofs
for multiclass logistic regression loss.
B.1. Standard ERM
Suppose y ∈ 1, ...,K, and let w = [w1; ... ;wK ] be a
stacked (d K)× 1 vector. The multiclass logistic loss (i.e.
softmax) is
l(h(x), y) = −wTy x+ log(
∑
l
ew
T
l x), (40)
and the regularized empirical risk is
RλS(w) = −
1
N
∑
i
[wTyixi − log(
∑
l
ew
T
l xi)] +
λ
2
‖w‖2.
(41)
Note that RλS(w) is λ-strongly convex in w.
The sensitivity of ws which minimizes (41) can be com-
puted as follows. Suppose S and S′ are two differ-
ent datasets which are not necessarily neighbors: S =
{(xi, yi))} and S′ = {(x′i, y′i)}. Let g(w) be the differ-
ence RλS(w) − RλS′(w) of the two risks. Then the partial
gradient w.r.t. wk is
∇wkRλS(w) = −
1
N
∑
i
xi∆k(xi, yi, w) + λwk, (42)
where
∆k(xi, yi, w) = I[yi = k]− e
wTk xi∑
l e
wTl xi
= I[yi = k]−Pk(xi).
(43)
Since I[yi = k] can be non-zero (i.e. 1) for only one k, and∑
k Pk(xi) = 1 with 0 ≤ Pk(xi) ≤ 1, we have∑
k
∆2k =
∑
k
(Ik − Pk)2 ≤
∑
k
(I2k + P
2
k ) ≤ 2, (44)
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Let ∆(xi, yi, w) = [∆1(xi, yi, w), ...,∆K(xi, yi, w)] be a
K×1 vector (which depends on xi, yi, w.) The gradient of
the risk difference g(w) is then
∇g(w) = − 1
N
∑
i
∆(xi, yi, w)⊗ xi−∆(x′i, y′i, w)⊗ x′i,
(45)
where ⊗ is a Kronecker product of two vectors. Note that
‖∆⊗x‖2 =
∑
k
‖∆kx‖2 ≤ ‖x‖2
∑
k
∆2k ≤ 2‖x‖2. (46)
Without loss of generality, we assume that only (x1, y1)
and (x′1, y
′
1) are possibly different and (xi, yi) = (x
′
i, y
′
i)
for all i = 2, ..., N . In this case we have
‖∇g(w)‖ ≤ 1
N
‖∆(x1, y1, w)⊗ x1‖
+
1
N
‖∆(x′1, y′1, w)⊗ x′1‖
≤
√
2
N
(‖x1‖+ ‖x′1‖) ≤
2
√
2
N
, (47)
and the therefore the L2 sensitive of the minimizer of a
multiclass logistic regression is
2
√
2
Nλ
(48)
from Corollaries 7 and 8 (Chaudhuri et al., 2011). Note that
the sensitivity does not depend on the number of classesK.
B.2. Majority-voted ERM
Let S = {(xi, vi)} and S′ = {(xi, v′i)} be two datasets
with the same features but with possibly different labels
for all i = 1, ..., N . Then the partial gradient of the risk
difference g(w) is
∇wkg(w) = −
1
N
∑
i
xi[I[vi = k]− I[v′i = k]]
= − 1
N
∑
i
xiak(vi, v
′
i), (49)
where ak(vi, v′i) is
ak(vi, v
′
i) = I[vi = k]− I[v′i = k] ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. (50)
Let a = [a1, ..., aK ] be a K × 1 vector (which depends
on vi, v′i.) Note that at most two elements of a can be
nonzero (i.e. ±1.) The gradient can be rewritten using the
Kronecker product ⊗ as
∇g(w) = − 1
N
∑
i
a(vi, v
′
i)⊗ xi, (51)
and its norm is bounded by
‖∇g(w)‖ ≤ 1
N
∑
i
√
2‖xi‖ ≤
√
2. (52)
Therefore the L2 sensitivity of the minimizer of majority-
labeled multiclass logistic regression is
√
2
λ
. (53)
B.3. Weighted ERM
A natural multiclass extension of the weighted loss (14) is
lα(w) =
∑
k
αk(x)l(wTk x), (54)
where αk(x) is the unbiased estimate of the probability
P (v = k|x). The corresponding weighted regularized em-
pirical risk is
RλS(w) =
1
N
∑
i
∑
k
αk(xi)l(w
T
k x) +
λ
2
‖w‖2
=
1
N
∑
i
∑
k
αk(xi)[log(
∑
l
ew
T
l xi)− wTk xi]
+
λ
2
‖w‖2
= − 1
N
∑
i
[
∑
k
αk(xi)w
T
k xi − log(
∑
l
ew
T
l xi)]
+
λ
2
‖w‖2, (55)
and its partial gradient is
∇wkRλS(w) = −
1
N
∑
i
xi
[
αk(xi)− e
wTk xi∑
l e
wTl xi
]
+ λwk.
(56)
Let S = {(xi, αi)} and S′ = {(xi, α′i)} be two datasets
with the same features but with possibly different labels
for all i = 1, ..., N . Then the partial gradient of the risk
difference g(w) is
∇wkg(w) = −
1
N
∑
i
xi[α
k(xi)− (α′)k(xi)]
= − 1
N
∑
i
xibk(α
k
i , (α
′)ki ), (57)
where bk(αki , (α
′)ki ) = α
k(xi) − (α′)k(xi). Let b =
[b1, ..., bK ] be aK×1 vector (which depends αi, α′i.) Note
that at most two elements of b can be nonzero (i.e.,±1/M .)
The gradient can then be rewritten as
∇g(w) = − 1
N
∑
i
b(αi, α
′
i)⊗ xi, (58)
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and its norm is bounded by
‖∇g(w)‖ ≤ 1
N
∑
i
√
2
M
‖xi‖ ≤
√
2
M
. (59)
Therefore the L2 sensitivity of the minimizer of the
weighted multiclass logistic regression is
√
2
Mλ
. (60)
B.4. Parameter averaging
For the purposes of comparison, we also derive the sensi-
tivity of parameter averaging (Pathak et al., 2010) for mul-
ticlass logistic regression. Let the two neighboring datasets
be W = (w1, w2, ..., wM ) and W ′ = (w′1, w
′
2, ..., w
′
M ),
which are collections of parameters from M parties. The
corresponding averages for the two sets are w¯ = 1M
∑
i wi
and w¯′ = 1M
∑
i w
′
i. Without loss of generality, we as-
sume the parameters w1 and w′1 differ only for party 1 and
wi = w
′
i for others i = 2, ...,M . Since ‖w¯ − w¯′‖ =
1
M ‖w1−w′1‖, the L2 sensitivity is 1/M times the sensitiv-
ity of the minimizer of the minimizer of a single classifier,
when all training samples of party 1 are allowed to change.
Therefore the L2 sensitivity of the average parameters for
multiclass logistic regression is 2
√
2
Mλ .
